Zilliqa Whitepaper

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The Z ILLIQA Technical Whitepaper [Version 0.1] August 10, 2017 The Z ILLIQA Team m www.zilliqa.com B [email protected] 7 @zilliqa Abstract—Existing cryptocurrencies and smart contract plat- consensus and network protocols. Therefore, even though re- forms are known to have scalability issues, i.e., the number of engineering the parameters of the existing protocols in say transactions they are capable of processing per second is limited, Bitcoin or Ethereum (e.g., the block size or the block rate) usually less than 10. As the number of applications utilizing public cryptocurrencies and smart contract platforms grow, the may show some speedup, to support applications that need demand for processing high transaction rates in the order of processing of thousands of Tx/s however requires rethinking hundreds and thousands of Tx/s is increasing. the underlying protocols from scratch. In this work, we present Z ILLIQA— a new blockchain platform We present Z ILLIQA— a new blockchain platform that is that is designed to scale in transaction rates. As the number of designed to scale in transaction rates. As the number of miners miners in Z ILLIQA increases, its transaction rates are expected to increase. At Ethereum’s present network size of 30,000 miners, in Z ILLIQA increases, its transaction rates are expected to Z ILLIQA would expect to process about a thousand times the increase as well. Specifically, Z ILLIQA’s design allows its transaction rates of Ethereum. The cornerstone in Z ILLIQA’s transaction rates to roughly double with every few hundred design is the idea of sharding — dividing the mining network nodes added to its network. As of this writing, the Ethereum into smaller shards each capable of processing transactions in mining network is over 30,000 nodes. At Ethereum’s present parallel. Z ILLIQA further proposes an innovative special-purpose smart capacity, Z ILLIQA would expect to process about a thousand contract language and execution environment that leverages the times the transaction rates of Ethereum. underlying architecture to provide a large scale and highly Z ILLIQA is a redesign from scratch and has been under efficient computation platform. The smart contract language in research and development for over 2 years. The cornerstone Z ILLIQA follows a dataflow programming style which makes it in Z ILLIQA’s design is the idea of sharding — dividing the ideal for running large-scale computations that can be easily parallelized. Examples include simple computations such as mining network into smaller consensus groups called shards search, sort and linear algebra computations, to more complex each capable of processing transactions in parallel. If the computations such as training neural nets, data mining, financial mining network of Z ILLIQA is say 8000 miners, Z ILLIQA modeling, scientific computing and in general any MapReduce automatically creates 10 sub-networks each of size 800 miners, task. in a decentralized manner without a trusted co-ordinator. Now, if one sub-network can agree on a set of (say) 100 transactions I. I NTRODUCTION in one time epoch, then 10 sub-networks can agree on a total Cryptocurrencies and smart contract platforms are becom- of 1000 transactions in aggregate. The key to aggregating ing a shared computational resource. One could view these securely is to ensure that sub-networks process different trans- platforms as a new generation of computers that synchronize actions (with no overlaps) without double-spending. over thousands of individual computers. However, existing The assumptions are similar to existing blockchain-based cryptocurrencies and smart contract platforms have widely solutions. We assume that the mining network will have a frac- recognized limitations in scaling. Average transaction rates in tion of malicious nodes/identities with a total computational Bitcoin [1], Ethereum [2], and related cryptocurrencies have power that is a fraction (< 1/4) of the complete network. been limited to below 10 (usually about 3-7) transactions It is based on a standard proof-of-work scheme, however, it per second (Tx/s). As the number of applications utilizing has a new two-layer blockchain structure. It features a highly public cryptocurrencies and smart contract platforms grow, the optimized consensus algorithm for processing shards. demand for processing high transaction rates in the order of Z ILLIQA further comes with an innovative special-purpose hundreds of Tx/s is increasing. A global payment network smart contract language and execution environment that lever- would likely require tens of thousands of Tx/s in capacity. age the underlying architecture to provide a large scale and Can we build a decentralized and open blockchain platform highly efficient computation platform. The smart contract capable of processing at that scale? language in Z ILLIQA follows a dataflow programming style, The limitations in scaling up existing protocols are some- where the smart contract can be represented as a directed what fundamental — they are rooted in the design of the graph. Nodes in the graph are operations or functions, while 1

an arc between two nodes represent the output of the first and Further, all byzantine nodes can collude together. We assume the input to the second. A node gets activated (or operational) that the total computation power of the byzantine adversaries as soon as all of its inputs become valid and thus a dataflow is still confined to standard cryptographic assumptions of contract is inherently parallel and suitable for decentralized probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries. systems such as Z ILLIQA. We however assume that messages from honest nodes (in The sharded architecture is ideal for running large-scale the absence of network partition) can be delivered to honest computations that can be easily parallelized. Examples include destinations after a certain bound δ, but δ may be time-varying. simple computations such as search, sort and linear algebra The bound δ is used to ensure liveness but not safety [3]. In computations, to more complex computations such as train- case such timing and connectivity assumptions are not met, it ing a neural net, data mining, financial modeling, scientific becomes possible for byzantine nodes to delay the messages computing and in general any MapReduce task among others. significantly (simulating a gain in computation power) or This document outlines the technical design of Z ILLIQA worse “eclipse” the network [4]. In the event of network blockchain protocol. Z ILLIQA has a new, conceptually clean partition, as dictated by the CAP theorem, one can only choose and modular design. It has six layers: the cryptographic layer between consistency and availability [5]. In Z ILLIQA, we (Section III), data layer (Section IV), the network layer (Sec- choose to be consistent and sacrifice availability. tion V), the consensus layer (Section VI), the smart contract layer (Section VII) and the incentive layer (Section VIII). III. C RYPTOGRAPHIC L AYER Before we present the different layers, we first discuss the The cryptographic layer defines the cryptographic primi- system settings, underlying assumptions and threat model tives used in Z ILLIQA. Similar to several other blockchain in Section II. platforms, Z ILLIQA relies on elliptic curve cryptography for digital signatures and a memory-hard hash function for proof- II. S YSTEM S ETTING AND A SSUMPTIONS of-work (PoW). Entities in Z ILLIQA. There are two main entities in Throughout this whitepaper, we extensively use SHA3 [6] Z ILLIQA: users and miners. A user is an external entity hash function to present our design. SHA3 is originally based who uses Z ILLIQA’s infrastructure to transfer funds or run on Keccak [7] which is widely used in different blockchain smart contracts. Miners are the nodes in the network who platforms in particular Ethereum. In the near future, we may run Z ILLIQA’s consensus protocol and get rewarded for their switch to Keccak to enable better interoperability with other service. In the rest of this whitepaper, we interchangeably use platforms. the terms miner and node. Z ILLIQA’s mining network is further divided into several A. Schnorr Signature smaller networks referred to as a shard. A miner is assigned Z ILLIQA employs Elliptic Curve Based Schnorr Signature to a shard by a set of miners called DS nodes. This set of DS Algorithm (EC-Schnorr) [8] as the base signing algorithm. nodes is also referred to as the DS committee. Each shard and We instantiate the scheme with secp256k1 curve [9]. The the DS committee has a leader. The leaders play an important same curve is currently used in Bitcoin and Ethereum but for role in the Z ILLIQA’s consensus protocol and for the overall a different signing algorithm called ECDSA. Choosing EC- functioning of the network. Schnorr over ECDSA has several benefits that we discuss Each user has a public, private key pair for a digital signa- below: ture scheme and each miner in the network has an associated 1) Non-malleability: Informally put, the non-malleability IP address and a public key that serves as an identity. property means that given a set of signatures generated on Intrinsic token. Z ILLIQA has an intrinsic token called a message using a private key, it should be hard for an Zillings or ZILs for short. Zillings give platform usage rights adversary to produce a new signature for the same message to the users in terms of using it to pay for transaction that is valid for the corresponding public key. Unlike ECDSA processing or run smart contracts. Throughout this whitepaper, which is malleable, EC-Schnorr has been proven to be non- any reference to amount, value, balance or payment, should malleable [10]. be assumed to be counted in ZIL. 2) Multisignature: A multisignature scheme allows multi- Adversarial model. We assume that the mining network at ple signers to “aggregate” their signatures on a given message any point of time has a fraction of byzantine nodes/identities into a single signature which can be authenticated against a with a total computational power that is at most f < n4 of the single public key that “aggregates” the keys of all the autho- complete network, where 0 ≤ f < 1 and n is the total size rized parties. While, EC-Schnorr is natively a multisignature of the network. The factor 14 is an arbitrary constant bounded scheme (see [11]), ECDSA allows creating multisignatures but away from 31 selected as such to yield reasonable constant in a less flexible way. parameters. We further assume that honest nodes are reliable Z ILLIQA uses EC-Schnorr based multisignatures to reduce during protocol runs, and failed or disconnected nodes are the signature size when multiple signatures are required on a counted in the byzantine fraction. message. Smaller signatures are particularly important in our Byzantine nodes can deviate from the protocol, drop or consensus protocol where multiple parties need to agree on a modify messages and send different messages to honest nodes. data by signing it. 2

3) Speed: EC-Schnorr is faster than ECDSA since the latter account. A normal account is created by generating an EC- requires computing an inverse modulo a large number. No Schnorr private key. A contract account is created by another inversion is required in EC-Schnorr. account. The exact EC-Schnorr key generation, signing and verifica- Each account is identified by an address derived differently tion procedures are given in Appendix A. In the Appendix, we depending on its type. The address for a normal account is also present how EC-Schnorr can be used as a multisignature derived from the account’s private key. For a given private scheme. key sk, the address Anormal is a 160-bit value computed as: B. Proof of Work Anormal = LSB160 (SHA3-256(PubKey(sk))), Z ILLIQA uses PoW only to prevent Sybil attacks and where, LSB160 (·) returns the rightmost 160 bits of the input generate node identities. This is in contrast to many ex- and PubKey(·) returns the public key corresponding to the in- isting blockchain platforms (in particular Bitcoin [1] and put secret key. The address for a contract account is computed Ethereum [12]), where PoW is used to reach distributed from the address of its creator and how many transactions the consensus. Z ILLIQA employs Ethash [13], the PoW algorithm creator account has sent, aka account nonce (described below). used in Ethereum 1.0. Ethash is a memory hard hash function designed to make it Acontract = LSB160 (SHA3-256(address||nonce)), easy to mine with GPUs but hard with specialized computing where, address is the address of the creator account, and hardware such as ASICs. To achieve this, Ethash computation nonce is the creator’s nonce value. requires a considerable amount of memory (in GBs) and I/O Each account (whether normal or contract) is associated bandwidth such that the function cannot be invoked in parallel with an account state. The account state is a key, value store on specialized computing hardware. and comprises of the following keys: Roughly speaking, Ethash takes a data (for instance a block 1) account nonce: (64 bits) A counter (initialized to header) and a nonce of 64-bits as inputs and generates a 256- 0) that counts the number of transactions sent from a bits digest. The algorithm consists of four subroutines which normal account. In case of a contract account, it counts are run in the given order: the number of contract creations made by the account. 1) Seed generation: Seed is a SHA3-256 digest which is 2) balance: (128 bits) A non-negative value. Whenever updated after every 30000 blocks called an epoch. For an account receives tokens from another account, the the first epoch it is the SHA3-256 hash of a series of received amount is added to the account’s balance. 32 bytes of zeros. For every other epoch it is always the When an account sends tokens to another account, the SHA3-256 hash of the previous seed. balance is reduced by the appropriate amount. 2) Cache generation: The seed is used to generate a pseu- 3) code hash: (256 bits) This stores SHA3-256 digest dorandom cache using SHA3-512. The size of the cache of the contract code. For a normal account it is the linearly increases with epoch. The initial size of the cache SHA3-256 digest of the empty string. is 16 MB. 4) storage root: (256 bits) Each account has a storage 3) Dataset generation: The cache is then used to generate which is again a key, value store with 256-bit keys and a dataset, where each “item” in the dataset depends on 256-bit values. storage root is a SHA3-256 digest only a small number of items in the cache. The dataset that represents this storage. For instance, if the storage is is updated once every epoch so that the miners do not a trie, then storage root is the digest of the root of have to make changes to it very frequently. The size of the trie. the dataset also increases linearly with epoch. The initial The global state (state) of Z ILLIQA is a mapping between size of the dataset is 1 GB. account addresses and account states. It is implemented using 4) Mining and Verification: Mining involves grabbing ran- a trie like data structure. dom slices of the dataset and hashing them together. Verification uses the cache to regenerate the specific B. Transactions pieces of the dataset needed to compute the hash. A transaction is always sent from a normal account address and it updates the global state of Z ILLIQA. A IV. DATA L AYER transaction has the following fields: Broadly speaking, the data layer defines the data that 1) version (32 bits): Current version. constitutes the global state of Z ILLIQA. By extension, it also 2) nonce (64 bits): A counter equal to the number of defines the data needed by the different entities in Z ILLIQA transactions sent by the sender of this transaction. to update its global state. 3) to (160 bits): Destination account address. In case the transaction creates a new contract account, this field is the A. Accounts, Addresses and State rightmost 160 bits of SHA3-256 of the empty string. Z ILLIQA is an account-based system (as Ethereum). There 4) amount (128 bits): The transaction amount to be trans- are two types of accounts: normal account and contract ferred to the destination address. 3

5) gas price (128 bits): Gas is defined as the smallest 2) Transaction Blocks: As discussed earlier, a DS-Block unit of computation. gas price is the amount that the contains information on the nodes who reach consensus on sender is willing to pay per unit of gas for computations transactions. TX-Block stores information on which transac- incurred in the transaction processing. tions were agreed upon by the nodes in a DS-Block. Every 6) gas limit (128 bits): The maximum amount of gas DS-Block is linked to multiple TX-Blocks. A TX-Block has that should be used while processing the transaction. three parts: header, data and signature. The header 7) code (unlimited): An expandable byte array that spec- consists of the following fields: ifies the contract code. It is present only when the 1) type (8 bits): A TX-Block is of two types, micro transaction creates a new contract account. block (0x00) and final block (0x01). More on these 8) data (unlimited): An expandable byte array that speci- in Section V-D. fies the data that should be used to process the transaction. 2) version (32 bits): Current version. It is present only when the transaction invokes a call to 3) previous hash (256 bits): The SHA3-256 digest of a contract at the destination address. its parent block header. 9) pubkey (264 bits): An EC-Schnorr public key that 4) gas limit (128 bits): Current limit for gas expenditure should be used to verify the signature. The pubkey field per block. also determines the sending address of the transaction. 5) gas used (128 bits): Total gas used by transactions in 10) signature (512 bits): An EC-Schnorr signature on the this block. entire data. 6) number (256 bits): The number of ancestor blocks. The Each transaction is uniquely identified by a genesis block has a block number of 0. transaction ID — a SHA3-256 digest of the transaction 7) timestamp (64 bits): Unix’s time() at the time of data that excludes the signature field. creation of this block. C. Blocks 8) state root (256 bits): It is a SHA3-256 digest that represents the global state after all transactions are The Z ILLIQA protocol introduces two types of blocks (and executed and finalized. If the global state is stored as a thereby two blockchains): transaction blocks (TX-Block) and trie, then state root is the digest of the root of the directory service blocks (DS-Block). TX-Block contains the trie. transactions sent by users, while DS-Block contains metadata 9) transaction root (256 bits): It is a SHA3-256 about the miners who participate in the consensus protocol. digest that represents the root of the Merkle tree that 1) DS Blocks: A DS-Block has two parts: the header stores all transactions that are present in this block. and the signature. The header part of DS-Block has the 10) tx hashes (each 256 bits): A list of SHA3-256 di- following fields: gests of the transactions. The signature part of the 1) version (32 bits): Current version. transaction is also hashed. 2) previous hash (256 bits): The SHA3-256 digest of 11) pubkey (264 bits): It is the EC-Schnorr public key of its parent block header. the leader who proposed the block. 3) pubkey (264 bits): The public key of the miner who did 12) pubkey micro blocks (unlimited): It is a list of EC- PoW on this block header. Schnorr public keys (each 264 bits in length). The list 4) difficulty (64 bits): This can be calculated from the contains the public keys of the leaders who proposed previous block’s difficulty and the block number. It stores transactions. The field is present only if it is a final block. the difficulty of the PoW puzzle. 13) parent block hash (256 bits): It is the SHA3-256 5) number (256 bits): The number of ancestor blocks. The digest of the previous final block header. genesis block has a block number of 0. 14) parent ds hash (256 bits): It is the SHA3-256 6) timestamp (64 bits): Unix’s time() at the time of digest of its parent DS-Block header. creation of this block. 15) parent ds block number (256 bits): It is the par- 7) mixHash (256 bits): A digest calculated from nonce ent DS-Block number. which allows detecting DoS attacks. 8) nonce (64 bits): A solution to the PoW. The data part of a TX-Block contains the set of transac- tions. It has the following fields: The signature part of DS-Block contains the following two fields: 1) tx count (32 bits): The number of transactions in this 1) signature (512 bits): The signature is an EC-Schnorr block. based multisignature on the DS-Block header signed by 2) tx list (unlimited): A list of transactions. DS nodes. The signature part of a TX-Block contains an EC- 2) bitmap (1024 bits): It records which DS nodes partic- Schnorr based multisignature. It has the following two fields: ipated in the multisignature. We denote the bitmap by a 1) signature (512 bits): The signature is an EC-Schnorr bit vector B, where, B[i] = 1 if the i-th node signed the based multisignature on the TX-Block header signed by header else B[i] = 0. a set of nodes. The signature is produced by a different DS-Blocks form a DS blockchain. set of nodes depending on whether it is a micro block or 4

a final block. Further details on the signatories is given After a successful bootstrapping phase, at any time, the in Section V-D. composition of the DS nodes is stipulated by a predefined 2) bitmap (1024 bits): It records which nodes participated window of size n0 . The most recent n0 nodes who have in the multisignature. We denote the bitmap by a bit successfully mined a DS-Block form the DS committee. vector B, where, B[i] = 1 if the i-th node signed the The average time between mining two consecutive DS- header else B[i] = 0. Blocks is referred to as the DS-epoch. The value of The final blocks form the transaction blockchain. The DS-epoch is set in a way to minimize the chances of two transaction blockchain does not include micro blocks. competing blocks. At the start of a DS-epoch, a new DS node joins the DS committee and the oldest member of the V. N ETWORK L AYER DS committee is churned out. This fixes the size of the DS Z ILLIQA has been designed to scale in transaction rates. The committee to n0 during any DS-epoch. The newest member main idea is that of sharding, i.e., dividing the mining network of the DS committee then becomes the leader and leads the into small shards, each capable of processing transactions in consensus protocol for the epoch (see Section VI for the parallel. In this section, we present the idea of network and consensus protocol). This further induces a strict ordering on transaction sharding. the members of the DS committee. One can show that if the DS committee size is sufficiently A. Network Sharding large (say above 800), then among the n0 members of the Network sharding, i.e., dividing the mining network into committee at most 13 are byzantine with high probability. smaller shards is a two-step process. First, a dedicated set of 2) Resolving Conflicts: Our consensus protocol (to be nodes called the directory service committee (or DS commit- presented in Section VI) does not permit forks in the DS tee) are elected which then shard the network and assign nodes blockchain. The forks may occur when multiple nodes solve to their shard. We present these processes below in further the puzzle at roughly the same time. In order to resolve the detail. conflict, each DS node retrieves the nonce field from the 1) Directory Service Committee: To facilitate sharding of received headers and sorts them in the increasing order. Let the network, we first elect a group of nodes, called directory us suppose that the largest nonce for the i-th DS node is service (DS) nodes. The DS nodes form a DS committee. nimax . The election of DS nodes is based on a proof-of-work puzzle The leader of the DS committee then proposes his own that we refer to as PoW1 . The algorithm for PoW1 is given header (that corresponds to the largest nonce he has seen) in Algorithm 1. and runs a consensus protocol to agree on the DS-Block header. The i-th DS node then agrees to accept the proposed Algorithm 1: PoW1 for DS committee election. header only if the corresponding nonce is larger than or equal Input: i: Current DS-epoch, DSi−1 : Prev. DS committee to nimax . Once the consensus is reached, the signature part composition. of the DS-Block is built and the agreed upon winner then Output: header: DS-Block header. becomes the leader. 1 On each competing node: 3) Generating Shards: Once the DS committee is elected, // get epoch randomness from the DS blockchain // DBi−1 : Most recent DS-Block before start of i-th epoch the actual sharding of the network can start. In order for a node 2 r1 ← GetEpochRand(DBi−1 ) to participate in the underlying consensus protocol, it has to // get epoch randomness from the transaction blockchain perform a proof-of-work (PoW2 ). The sharding protocol is // TBj : Most recent TX-Block before start of i-th epoch repeated at the start of every DS-epoch. The algorithm for 3 r2 ← GetEpochRand(TBj ) PoW2 is given in Algorithm 2. // pk: node’s public key, IP = node’s IP address 4 nonce, mixHash ← Ethash-PoW(pk, IP, r1 , r2 ) 5 header ← BuildHeader(nonce, mixHash, pk) Algorithm 2: PoW2 for shard membership. // header includes pk and nonce among other fields Input: i: Current DS-epoch, DSi : Current DS committee // IP, header is multicast to members in the DS committee composition. 6 MulticastToDSi−1 (IP, header) Output: nonce, mixHash: outputs of Ethash-PoW 7 return header 1 On each competing node: // get epoch randomness from the DS blockchain // DBi−1 : Most recent DS-Block before start of i-th epoch Each node that has successfully produced a valid nonce 2 r ← GetEpochRand(DBi ) for PoW1 earlier than other nodes proposes a header for // pk: node’s public key, IP = node’s IP address a new DS-Block. Recall that a DS-Block has a header 3 nonce, mixHash ← Ethash-PoW(pk, IP, r) and a signature part. When a node does a PoW1 , it // IP, header is multicast to members in the DS committee only generates a DS-Block header. The header is then 4 MulticastToDSi (nonce, mixHash, pk, IP) 5 return nonce, mixHash multicast to the nodes in the DS committee. The DS committee then runs a consensus on the proposed DS-Block header and then builds a signature part. Once, 2f DS nodes have signed The computed valid nonce (and mixhash) for PoW2 the DS-Block header, it is committed to the DS blockchain. is then multicast to the DS committee. The DS nodes will 5

collectively accept just enough PoW solutions to be sharded the sender’s address, i.e., the address of the account A in into l consensus committees or shards, each with n0 nodes to the example. As the account address is a 160-bit integer, ℓ run consensus. Once enough number of PoW2 solutions have is bounded above as: been received by the leader of the DS committee, he initiates a ⌊log2 ℓ⌋ + 1 ≤ 160. consensus protocol to agree on the set of valid PoW2 solutions. At the end of the consensus protocol, the leader generates an In practice though, ℓ will be smaller than 100. EC-Schnorr multisignature signed by the DS nodes. In order Once the assigned shard is identified, the transaction is then to proceed further, more than 2/3 of the DS nodes must have multicast to some nodes within the shard who then broadcast it agreed on the set of acceptable PoW2 solutions. further. Once the transaction reaches the leader of the assigned Sharding leverages a deterministic function to assign a node shard, it includes it in a TX-Block and runs the consensus to a shard. Let us assume that we need ℓ shards each having protocol. n0 nodes. The nonce values are then sorted in the increasing Double spend (or replay attacks) can be easily detected order and the first n0 nodes are assigned to the first shard, the using the nonce present in every transaction. Recall that next n0 to the next shard and so on. The identity of the miner each transaction has a nonce that counts the number of who proposed the largest nonce within a shard is declared its transactions sent from the sender’s account. Once a transaction leader. This further induces a strict ordering on the members gets into the transaction blockchain, the nonce is updated of the shard. in the account’s state and thereby in the global state. A One can also show that if n0 is sufficiently large (say above transaction with a nonce value smaller than or equal to the 800), then within each shard at most 13 are byzantine with high current value in the global state gets rejected by the miners. probability. Sharding transactions based on the sender’s account address natively allows shard members to detect double spend as every B. Public Channel transaction from a sender will be processed within the same The DS nodes publish certain information on the public shard. channel, including the identities and connection information 2) Transaction Processing: All the nodes within a commit- of the DS nodes, the list of nodes in each shard, as well as tee can propose transactions. These transactions are sent to the the sharding logic for transactions (explained in Section V-D). leader to run a consensus protocol on which set of transactions The public channel is untrusted and is assumed to be accessible forms the next TX-Block. Blocks proposed by each shard is by all nodes. In our implementation, our broadcast primitive called a micro block (identified by the type marker 0x00). A implements such a public channel. micro block contains an EC-Schnorr multisignature by more A user of our blockchain who would like to submit a than 23 nodes from the shard. The leader also builds a bitmap transaction for acceptance can then check the information B that identifies the public keys of the signers. B[i] = 1 if on sharding to get the shard responsible for processing her the i-th member of the shard has signed the TX-Block header. transaction. The information published on the public channel When a shard reaches a consensus on a TX-Block, its leader is expected to be signed by more than 2/3 of the DS nodes multicasts the block header and the signature to some that can be verified by any node or user. of the DS nodes. The DS nodes then broadcast it within the DS committee so that the block reaches its leader. The data C. New Nodes Joining Z ILLIQA part of the block can be asynchronously sent to the nodes. For a new node to join the network, it can attempt to solve The DS committee then aggregates all blocks sent from PoW1 to become a DS node or a PoW2 to become a member the shards, and runs another round of the consensus protocol of a shard. To this end, it would need to obtain information among themselves to agree on the final block. A final block on the randomness required for a PoW1 or a PoW2 from the is a TX-Block identified by the type marker 0x01. A final blockchains. Once it obtains the randomness information, the block contains an EC-Schnorr multisignature by more than 2 new node can submit its solution to the DS committee. 3 n0 nodes from the DS committee. The leader in the DS committee also builds a bitmap B that identifies the public D. Transaction Sharding and Processing keys of the signers. B[i] = 1 if the i-th member of the DS As presented in Section V-A, network sharding creates committee has signed the TX-Block header. The final block shards each capable of processing transactions in parallel. header and the signature, is then multicast to some In this section, we present how a particular transaction gets nodes within each shard. The actual TX-Block data is not assigned to a shard and how the transactions get processed. sent by the DS nodes. n For this purpose, we use the following abstraction: A − → B to Within each shard the following steps are taken to process indicate a transaction of n ZIL from the sender’s account A the final block: to the receiver’s account B. 1) Each node in the shard verifies the EC-Schnorr multisig- n 1) Transaction Assignment: Any transaction say A − → B nature using the public keys of the DS nodes. If the gets processed by a single shard. Assuming that there are ℓ signatures are valid against more than 23 n0 public keys shards numbered from 0 to ℓ − 1, a transaction is assigned represented by the bitmap, then the nodes perform the to a shard identified by the ⌊log2 ℓ⌋ + 1 rightmost bits of next checks. 6

2) For each transaction hash included in the final block PBFT relies upon a correct leader to begin each phase and header, the node checks whether its corresponding proceed when the sufficient majority exists. In case the leader transaction content is available. If the corresponding is byzantine it can stall the entire consensus protocol. To transaction was proposed by the shard to which the node address this challenge, PBFT offers a view change protocol belongs, then the hash of the transaction data is compared to replace the byzantine leader with another one. If the with the hash contained in the final block header. nodes do not see any progress for a bounded time, they can If the transaction was proposed by another shard, the independently announce the desire to change the leader. If a transaction data is shared asynchronously across shards. quorum of more than 32 n nodes decides that the leader is faulty, 3) Once the transaction data is available, the data part then the next leader in a well-known schedule takes over. of the final block is reconstructed and the TX-Block is Owing to the multicast of every node in the prepare/commit appended to the local transaction blockchain. The account phase, the communication complexity for PBFT in the normal state and the global state are accordingly updated. case is O(n2 ). 4) If the transaction content is not available, the node B. Improving Efficiency temporarily invalidates the sending account of that trans- action in its local view of accounts so that any other Classical PBFT uses message authentication code (MAC) pending transactions for this account are rejected until for authenticated communication between nodes. As MAC the local transaction content can be brought in sync with requires a secret key shared between every two nodes, the the global state. Such rejected transactions will have nodes in one consensus group can agree on the same record to be retried by the sending node. with a communication complexity of O(n2 ) per node. Due to the quadratic complexity, PBFT becomes impractical when VI. C ONSENSUS L AYER the committee has over 20 nodes. To improve the efficiency, we use the ideas inspired from As mentioned earlier, each shard and the DS committee have ByzCoin [15]: to run a consensus protocol on the micro blocks and the final 1) We replace MAC with digital signatures to effectively blocks respectively. In this section, we present the consensus reduce the communication overhead to O(n). layer which defines the consensus protocol to run within each 2) In the meantime, to allow the other nodes to verify the shard and the DS committee. In the rest of the discussion, agreement, one typical way is to collect the signatures we refer to shards and the DS committees collectively as a from the honest majority and append them to the agree- consensus group. ment, thereby resulting in the agreement size linear in A. Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance the size of the consensus group. To improve on this, we employ EC-Schnorr multisignatures to aggregate several The core of Z ILLIQA’s consensus protocol relies on prac- signatures into an O(1)-size multisignature. tical byzantine fault tolerance (PBFT) protocol proposed by We however cannot directly use the classical EC-Schnorr Castro and Liskov [3]. We however improve its efficiency by multisignature scheme in the PBFT setting. This is because in using the idea of employing EC-Schnorr multisignature in the the classical setting all the signers agree on signing a given PBFT protocol as developed in [14], [15]. Use of EC-Schnorr message and the signature is valid only when all the signers multisignature lowers the normal case communication latency have signed the message. In the PBFT setting, we only require from O(n2 ) to O(n) and reduces the signature size from O(n) that the message be signed by over 32 n nodes in the consensus to O(1), where n is the size of the consensus group. In this group. One of the main modification required is to maintain section, we present an overview of PBFT. a bitmap B for the signers who participate in the signing In PBFT, all the nodes within a consensus group are ordered process. If the i-th node participated in the process, B[i] = 1, in a sequence, and it has one primary node (or leader) and the else it is 0. The bitmap is build by the leader. The bitmap others are referred to as backup nodes. Every round of PBFT can then be used by any verifier to validate the signature. The has three phases as discussed below: resulting protocol is left in Appendix B. 1) Pre-prepare phase: In this phase, the leader announces the next record (a TX-Block in our case) that the group C. Z ILLIQA Consensus should agree on. In Z ILLIQA, we use PBFT as the basis consensus protocol 2) Prepare phase: Upon receiving the pre-prepare message, and employ two rounds EC-Schnorr multisignatures to replace every node validates its correctness and multicasts a the prepare and commit phases in PBFT. The different modi- prepare message to all the other nodes. fications to the PBFT phases are explained below. 3) Commit phase: Upon receiving more than 23 n prepare 1) Pre-prepare phase: As in standard PBFT, the leader messages, a node multicasts a commit message to the distributes a TX-Block or a statement (signed by the group Finally, a node waits for more than 32 commit leader) to all the nodes in the consensus group. messages to ensure that a sufficient number of nodes 2) Prepare phase: All honest nodes check the validity of have made the same decision. Therefore, all honest nodes the TX-Block and the leader collects responses from accept the same valid record. more than 2n 3 nodes. This guarantees that the statement 7

proposed by the leader is safe and consistent with all computations such as training a neural net, data mining, previous histories. The signature is generated using EC- financial modeling, etc. Schnorr multisignature. The leader also builds the bitmap Z ILLIQA’s computational sharding approach relies on a of nodes who signed the TX-Block. new smart contract language that is not Turing-complete but 3) Commit phase: To ensure that more than 2n 3 nodes scales much better for a multitude of applications. The smart know the fact that more than 2n 3 nodes have verified the contract language in Z ILLIQA follows a dataflow programming TX-Block, we perform a second round of EC-Schnorr style [16], [17]. In the dataflow execution model, a contract multisignature. The statement being signed is the mul- is represented by a directed graph. Nodes in the graph are tisignature generated from the last round. primitive instructions or operations. Directed arcs between two At the end of the three phases, the consensus is reached on nodes represent the data dependencies between the operations, the TX-Block proposed by the leader. i.e., output of the first and the input to the second. A node gets activated (or operational) as soon as all of its inputs are D. Leader Change available. This stands in contrast to the classical von Neumann In our consensus protocol, if the leader is honest, it can execution model (as employed in Ethereum), in which an drive the nodes in the consensus group to reach agreements on instruction is only executed when the program counter reaches new sets of transactions continuously. However, if the leader it, regardless of whether or not it can be executed earlier. is byzantine, it can intentionally delay or drop messages from The key advantage of employing a dataflow approach is honest nodes, and slow down the protocol. To penalize such that more than one instruction can be executed at once. Thus, malicious leaders, our protocol changes the leader of each if several nodes in the graph become activated at the same shard and the DS committee periodically. This prevents the time, they can be executed in parallel. This simple principle byzantine leader to stall the consensus protocol for an infinite provides the potential for massive parallel execution. To see time. Since all the nodes are ordered, the next leader will been this, we present a simple sequential program in Figure 1a with chosen in a round robin manner. three instructions and in Figure 1b, we present its dataflow In fact, the leader of a shard is changed after every micro variant. Under the von Neumann execution model, the program block and the leader of the DS committee is changed after would run in three time units: first computing A, then B and every final block. Let us assume that the size of the consensus finally C. The model does not capture the fact that A and B group is n, then within a DS-epoch, we allow a maximum can be independently computed. The dataflow program on the of n final blocks, each final block aggregating a maximum of other hand can compute these two values in parallel. The node 1 micro block per shard. that performs addition gets activated as soon as A and B are available. VII. S MART C ONTRACT L AYER Z ILLIQA comes with an innovative special-purpose smart contract language and execution environment that leverages x y 20 the underlying architecture to provide a large scale and highly efficient computation platform. In this section, we present the ∗ / smart contract layer that employs a dataflow programming A B architecture. A=x∗y + A. Computational Sharding using Dataflow Paradigm B = y/20 Z ILLIQA’s smart contract language and its execution plat- C =A+B C form is designed to leverage the underlying network and (a) A simple program. (b) Dataflow program. transaction sharding architecture. The sharded architecture is Fig. 1: (a): A simple sequential program with three instructions ideal for running computation-intensive tasks in an efficient (b): Its dataflow variant. manner. The key idea is the following: only a subset of the network (such as a shard) would perform the computation. We refer to this approach as computational sharding. When run on the Z ILLIQA’s sharded network, each node in In contrast with existing smart contract architectures (such the dataflow program can be eventually attributed to a single as Ethereum), computational sharding in Z ILLIQA takes a shard or even a small subset of nodes within a shard. Hence the very different approach towards how to process contracts. architecture is ideal for any MapReduce style computational In Ethereum, every full node is required to perform the tasks, where some node perform the mapping task while same computation to validate the outcome of the computation another node can work as a reducer to aggregate the work and update the global state. Albeit being secure, such a done by each mapper. fully redundant programming model is prohibitively expen- In order to facilitate the execution of a dataflow program,, sive for running large-scale computations that can be easily Z ILLIQA’s smart contract language has the following features: parallelized. Examples include simple computations such as 1) Operating over a virtual memory space shared globally search, sort and linear algebra computations, to more complex across the entire blockchain. 8

2) Locking of intermediate cells in the virtual shared mem- learning), it is imperative to have an infrastructure that ory space during execution. allows deep learning models to train on large datasets. It 3) Checkpointing intermediate results during execution com- is well known that training on large datasets is crucial to a mitted to blockchain. model’s accuracy. To this end, Z ILLIQA’s computational sharding and dataflow language will be particularly useful B. Smart Security Budgeting to build machine learning applications. It will serve as Apart form the benefits of parallelization offered from an infrastructure that may run tools like TensorFlow1 by the dataflow computation model, Z ILLIQA further provides tasking groups of Z ILLIQA nodes to independently per- a flexible security budgeting mechanism for computational form different computations such as computing gradients, sharding. This feature is enabled by sharding the computa- apply activation function, compute training loss, etc. tional resources in the blockchain network via an overlay 3) Application with high complexity and high precision above the consensus process. Computational sharding allows algorithms: Different from the applications mentioned users of Z ILLIQA and applications running on Z ILLIQA to above, some applications, such as computations over specify the sizes of consensus groups to compute for each financial models, may require high precision. Any minor of the subtasks. Each consensus group will then be tasked to deviation in one part of the computation may incur compute the same subtask, and produce the results. The user heavy losses in investments. Such applications can task specifies the condition on acceptance of the results, e.g., all in consensus groups of larger number of nodes in Z ILLIQA the consensus group must produce the same results, or 3/4 of to allow them to cross-check the computational results them must produce the same results, etc. of each other. The key challenge in offloading the com- A user of the application running on Z ILLIQA can budget putational tasks of such financial modeling algorithms to how much she wants to spend on computing and security, a public platform, such as Z ILLIQA, is the concern for respectively. In particular, a user running a particular deep data privacy and intellectual property of the algorithms. learning application may spend more gas fee on running more To begin with, we envision certain well known portion of of different neural network tasks than letting too many nodes such computation can be placed to Z ILLIQA for efficient repeating the same computation. In this case, she can specify and secure computation first, while the future research a smaller consensus group for running each neural network and development of Z ILLIQA will further strengthen the computation. On the other hand, a sophisticated financial protection of data privacy and intellectual property for modeling algorithm that requires greater precision may task such applications. consensus groups of larger number of nodes to compute the critical portions of the algorithm to be more resilient against VIII. I NCENTIVE L AYER potential tampering and manipulation of the results. A. Token Supply C. Scalable Applications: Examples Z ILLIQA has a finite supply of 21 billion ZILs. The smallest unit being 10−12 part of a ZIL. Each final TX-Block comes Z ILLIQA aims to provide a platform to run highly scalable with a block reward that generates new tokens. The block computations in a multitude of fields such as data mining, reward will be spread over a period of 10 years decreasing machine learning and financial modeling to name a few. Since over time. We aim to mine roughly 80% of the tokens in the supporting efficient sharding of Turing-complete programs first 4 years and the remaining 20% in the next 6 years. The is very challenging, and there exist public blockchains that token emission will be “smooth” in the sense that the block support Turing-complete smart contracts (e.g., Ethereum), reward does not reduce drastically after a certain number of Z ILLIQA focuses on specific applications with requirements blocks. The smooth reduction in the block reward means that not met today. the network hashrate can be expected to be stable as the reward 1) Computation with parallelizable computation load: reduces over gradually over time. Scientific computing over large data is a typical exam- After 10 years, we expect to have reached significant scale ple where one requires a large amount of distributed both in terms of the number of nodes in the network and users computing power. Moreover, most of these computations executing transactions. By then, we expect the market to have are highly parallelizable, examples include linear algebra stabilized upon certain rates of transaction fees to fully sustain operations on large matrices, search in the sea of huge the running of the network without a need for new tokens amount of data and simulation on a large dataset among entering the system as rewards. others. Z ILLIQA provides such computing tasks an inex- pensive and short turnaround alternative. Moreover, with B. Incentivizing Miners the right incentive in place with computational sharding, Miners reach consensus on transactions, process them, per- and security budgeting Z ILLIQA can be leveraged as a form computations as per the smart contract and update the readily available and highly reliable resource for such global state. Miners are hence incentivized by requiring the heavy computation load. sender of each transaction to pay some gas upfront. 2) Train neural nets: With the ever growing popularity and use cases of machine learning (in particular deep 1 https://www.tensorflow.org/ 9

Recall that each final TX-Block aggregates at most one Z ILLIQA also proposes a smart contract platform not available micro block from each shard. Each micro TX-Block contains a in ByzCoin/OmniLedger. gas used field that stores the total gas used by transactions Z ILLIQA’s smart contract platform takes a different ap- in the block. Each final TX-Block also has a gas used field proach when compared with Ethereum. Z ILLIQA’s smart that is a sum of all the gas used field of each micro TX- contract platform leverages the underlying sharding architec- Block. Once a TX-Block is proposed, the corresponding gas ture and is based on dataflow programming. The advantages used and the block reward is almost equitably distributed of dataflow programs are many: inherent concurrency and among 1) the leaders of the shards who proposed one micro parallelism, easy to reason about their correctness, natural block and 2) the leader of the DS committee who proposed composability of functions and programs, etc. the final. In case the equitable distribution is not possible, the X. F UTURE R ESEARCH D IRECTIONS distribution is slightly biased towards the leader of the DS Below, we discuss some ongoing and future directions of committee. Hence, if the reward is m and the total number research to improve Z ILLIQA. of stake holders for a reward is n, then the leader of each State sharding. With increase in Z ILLIQA’s user base and shard gets ⌊ m n ⌋, while, the leader of the DS committee gets its high transaction throughput would come the following m − n · ⌊m n ⌋. challenge: How to efficiently handle the continuous influx of As the leader of each shard is changed once a new micro blocks that modify the global state. This is also referred to block is proposed, every member of the shard gets rewarded. as state sharding in the literature. In essence, state sharding Similarly, as the leader of the DS committee is changed after will alleviate full nodes from storing and receiving all blocks every final block, every member of the DS committee is also and transactions. This way it can further reduce the storage rewarded. and communication load for nodes, and thus constitute another scaling-up factor to the throughput. However, it is non-trivial IX. R ELATED W ORK to design a secure and efficient state sharding scheme, as Z ILLIQA is developed upon the ideas of Bitcoin-NG [18], cross-shard communications arising from state sharding may collective signing (CoSi) [14], ByzCoin [15], Elastico [19] and outweigh the performance gains. More research needs to be OmniLedger [20]. done to address such additional complexities. Bitcoin-NG first proposed the idea to decouple leader elec- Secure Proof-of-Stake (SPoS). To the best of our knowl- tion and his block proposals within Bitcoin. First, a leader edge, there has been no literature that proposes a secure is elected by mining a keyblock who can then mint many PoS scheme, and thus we base Z ILLIQA’s building blocks on microblocks within the 10 minute block interval. The idea was a PoW scheme. However, given the significant performance further used in ByzCoin [15]. gain from PoS for consensus algorithms, it is worthwhile The idea of network and transaction sharding for a Bit- investigating further into the PoS paradigm, in search for a coin like system was first proposed in [19]. However, net- secure and efficient PoS scheme for Z ILLIQA. work/transaction sharding alone cannot solve the scalability Storage pruning. We are currently exploring ways to issues as each shard needs to sign a TX-Block which makes securely prune the dated blocks stored on the blockchain to the total number of signatures linear in the number of signers. reduce the storage requirements and ease the joining process This eventually results in a large block size and becomes a for new nodes. We may consider multi-grade storage, com- bottleneck during the broadcast/multi-cast. pression of blocks and transactions as possible solutions. Cross-Chain support. Z ILLIQA has every intention to Multisignatures [11] provides a solution to the above prob- complement other public blockchains and build a healthy lem. CoSi [14] uses an EC-Schnorr multisignature scheme to ecosystem to provide end users a broad spectrum of platforms design a protocol for collective signing. CoSi was proposed to of choice for their applications. To this end, Z ILLIQA will seek work in a much less hostile environment than that of a public technical solutions to support gradual cross-chain communi- blockchain with byzantine nodes. With several significant cation and potentially enable cross-chain applications. enhancements we develop for the CoSi scheme, we derive a Privacy-preserving computation. It is desirable for several secure scheme and apply it to Z ILLIQA. applications in particular (financial modeling applications) Several other proposals have surfaced to sidestep the in- to have strong privacy and intellectual property protection herent scalability limitation of existing blockchain protocols, when running on Z ILLIQA. Solutions based on Oblivious for instance, re-parameterizing the original Bitcoin protocol RAM to hide access pattern on an encrypted data [21], ZK- (e.g. increasing block sizes), moving as much computation off- SNARK [22] to hide the input to a program, and private chain (e.g. micropayment channels and lightening networks), function evaluation [23] to hide the contract’s business logic creating hierarchy of blockchains (e.g. sidechains). None of are also being investigated. these protocols directly make the blockchain protocol itself more scalable. Z ILLIQA targets the heart of the scalability XI. CONCLUSION problem – its blockchain. In this whitepaper, we have presented Z ILLIQA’s sharding Z ILLIQA can be seen as an extension of ByzCoin and Om- architecture that allows the mining network to process trans- niLedger with several security and performance optimizations. actions in parallel and reach high throughput. Z ILLIQA also 10

comes with a unique smart contract platform that leverages [21] E. Stefanov, M. van Dijk, E. Shi, C. W. Fletcher, L. Ren, X. Yu, the underlying sharing architecture and follows a dataflow and S. Devadas, “Path ORAM: An Extremely Simple Oblivious RAM Protocol,” in 2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Com- programming paradigm. The new smart contract language is munications Security, CCS’13, Berlin, Germany, November 4-8, 2013, ideal for running computation-intensive task in an efficient 2013, pp. 299–310. manner. [22] E. Ben-Sasson, A. Chiesa, E. Tromer, and M. Virza, “Succinct Non- Interactive Zero Knowledge for a von Neumann Architecture,” in Proceedings of the 23rd USENIX Security Symposium, San Diego, CA, USA, August 20-22, 2014., 2014, pp. 781–796. R EFERENCES [23] P. Mohassel, S. S. Sadeghian, and N. P. Smart, “Actively Secure Private Function Evaluation,” in Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2014 - 20th International Conference on the Theory and Application [1] S. 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Cryptol- is hard [8], [24], [25]. Z ILLIQA uses the elliptic curve group ogy, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 161–174, 1991. defined over the popular secp256k1 curve. We denote by [9] C. Research, “SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain C := (p, G, n) the set of parameters that define the group, Parameters,” 2000. [Online]. Available: http://www.secg.org/download/ aid-386/sec2-final.pdf where p is a prime number that specifies the underlying field [10] A. Poelstra, “Schnorr Signatures are Non-Malleable in the Random Fp , G is the base point on the curve and n (a prime) is the Oracle Model,” 2014. order of G. EC-Schnorr also requires a cryptographic hash [11] S. Micali, K. Ohta, and L. Reyzin, “Accountable-subgroup Multisigna- tures: Extended Abstract,” in Proceedings of the 8th ACM Conference function H that we instantiate with SHA3-256 [6]. on Computer and Communications Security, ser. CCS ’01. New York, EC-Schnorr is a set of three algorithms KeyGen, Sign NY, USA: ACM, 2001, pp. 245–254. and Verify that we present in this section. In the algorithms [12] G. Wood, “Ethereum: A secure decentralised generalised transaction below, for any scalar x and a point Q, we denote the scalar ledger,” http://gavwood.com/paper.pdf, 2014. [13] “Ethash,” https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Ethash, Accessed on multiplication by [x]Q. June 27, 2017., version 23. 1) KeyGen(C): The algorithm takes the curve parameters [14] E. Syta, I. Tamas, D. Visher, D. I. Wolinsky, P. Jovanovic, L. Gasser, C and returns a pair of public (pk) and private (sk) keys. N. Gailly, I. Khoffi, and B. Ford, “Keeping authorities ”honest or bust” with decentralized witness cosigning,” in IEEE Symposium on Security KeyGen(C = (p, G, n)) and Privacy, SP 2016, San Jose, CA, USA, May 22-26, 2016, 2016, pp. $ 526–545. 1. Choose sk ← [1, n − 1], [15] E. Kokoris-Kogias, P. Jovanovic, N. Gailly, I. Khoffi, L. Gasser, and 2. Set pk ← [sk]G, B. Ford, “Enhancing Bitcoin Security and Performance with Strong Con- sistency via Collective Signing,” in 25th USENIX Security Symposium, 3. return (pk, sk). USENIX Security 16, Austin, TX, USA, August 10-12, 2016., 2016, pp. 279–296. 2) Sign(C, pk, sk, m): This algorithm is run by the signer. It [16] Arvind and D. E. Culler, “Annual review of computer science vol. 1, takes the curve parameters C, a public key and a private 1986,” J. F. Traub, B. J. Grosz, B. W. Lampson, and N. J. Nilsson, Eds. Palo Alto, CA, USA: Annual Reviews Inc., 1986, ch. Dataflow key pair (pk, sk) and a message to sign m ∈ {0, 1}∗ . It Architectures, pp. 225–253. returns a signature σ. [17] A. L. Davis and R. M. Keller, “Data flow program graphs,” Computer, Sign(C, pk, sk, m) vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 26–41, Feb. 1982. $ [18] I. Eyal, A. E. Gencer, E. G. Sirer, and R. van Renesse, “Bitcoin- 1. Choose k ← [1, n − 1], ng: A scalable blockchain protocol,” in 13th USENIX Symposium on 2. Set Q ← [k]G, Networked Systems Design and Implementation, NSDI 2016, Santa Clara, CA, USA, March 16-18, 2016, 2016, pp. 45–59. 3. Set r ← H(Q||pk||m) mod n, [19] L. Luu, V. Narayanan, C. Zheng, K. Baweja, S. Gilbert, and P. Saxena, 4. If r = 0 Goto 1. “A secure sharding protocol for open blockchains,” in Proceedings of 5. Set s ← k − r · sk mod n, the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Vienna, Austria, October 24-28, 2016, 2016, pp. 17–30. 6. If s = 0 Goto 1. [20] E. Kokoris-Kogias, P. Jovanovic, L. Gasser, N. Gailly, and B. Ford, 7. Set σ ← (r, s), “Omniledger: A secure, scale-out, decentralized ledger,” IACR Cryptol- 8. return σ. ogy ePrint Archive, vol. 2017, p. 406, 2017. 11

3) Verify(C, σ, pk, m): This algorithm is run by a verifier 2) Commitment Generation: Each signer Pi then choses a $ who wishes to check the validity of a signature. It takes random ki ← [1, n − 1] and computes Qi = [ki ]G. Recall the curve parameters C, a signature σ, a public key pk that G is the base point on the elliptic curve and n is the and a message m. It returns 1 if the signature is valid for order of G. Pi then sends Qi to the aggregator. m under pk, or else returns 0. 3) Challenge Generation: TheP aggregator first computes the Verify(C, σ, pk, m) aggregated keys: pk P = pki ∈P pki for keys in P . She also computes Q = i Qi for Qi ’s received in the pre- 1. Parse (r, s) ← σ, vious step. She then computes r ← H(Q||pk||m) mod n 2. If r, s ∈ / [1, n − 1] return 0. and sends (r, Q, pk) to each Pi . 3. Set Q ← [s]G + [r]pk, 4) Response Generation: Each signer Pi first checks the 4. If Q = O(neutral point) return 0. integrity of r received previously. This is done by re- 5. Set v ← H(Q||pk||m) mod n, computing H(Q||pk||m) and checking if it is equal to the 6. If v = r return 1, else return 0. received r. If the check fails then Pi aborts the protocol or else generates si ← (ki − r · ski ) mod n and sends si to the aggregator. B. EC-Schnorr Multisignature Scheme 5) Response Aggregation: Aggregator P computes the ag- 1) Setting & Assumptions: EC-Schnorr can also be used gregated response s = s i i mod n and builds an as a multisignature scheme [11]. In a multisignature scheme, aggregated signature σ = (r, s). She then sends (m, σ) we have T signers: P1 , . . . , PT , an aggregator and a verifier. to the verifier. The signers wish to jointly sign a message m. The aggregator 6) Signature Verification: Verifier now checks whether the plays the role of a facilitator and aggregates the signatures sent signature is valid. She performs the following steps: by each individual signer. The verifier verifies the aggregated a) Aggregate the public keys in P as pk ′ . signature. The role of aggregator and the verifier can be played b) Check if σ is a valid EC-Schnorr signature on m for by the same entity. the public key pk ′ by invoking Verify(C, σ, pk ′ , m). Each signer Pi has her own public private key pair (pki , ski ) Returns the output of Verify. for EC-Schnorr single signer scheme. We denote by P = {pk1 , . . . , pkT } the set of all public keys. We also assume A PPENDIX B a public message mp known to every entity. The message mp M ULTISIGNATURE FOR PBFT may be specific to the application scenario and make take Classical EC-Schnorr multisignature protocol as described the following form: I know the private key for in Appendix A requires the participation of all the participants. my public key for the session id: XXXX. The Hence, we cannot directly use it in the PBFT setting, where, purpose of this message is to defeat certain known attacks we only require that the message be signed by at least 23 n + 1 on the scheme [26]. nodes in the committee. In this section, we present a tweak 2) Multisignature Protocol: Multisignature is an interactive to this protocol inspired from [14]. The tweak consists in protocol between signers, the aggregator and the verifier maintaining two bitmaps that record the participation in the (see Figure 2 for a schematic representation). The protocol protocol. The modified protocol is given in Figure 3. Below, has six steps as described below. we briefly present the protocol. 1) (One-Time) Identity Setup: This step is run between 1) (One-Time) Identity Setup: This step is exactly the same each participant and the verifier. At the start of the pro- as in the classical EC-Schnorr multisignature protocol as tocol, each signer Pi if not currently involved in another presented in Appendix A. Only if the set up successfully signing protocol generates an EC-Schnorr signature σi on terminates, the next steps of the protocol can start. the message mp . Pi then sends (σi , pki ) to the verifier. 2) Commitment Generation: This step is similar to the The verifier then performs the following checks: classical EC-Schnorr multisignature protocol. The only a) Check if pki ∈ P . If the check fails, the verifier aborts. difference being that each participant Pi also sends its b) Check if each σi is a valid EC-Schnorr signature on public key pki along with a Qi to the aggregator. mp for pki , by invoking Verify(C, σi , pki , mp ). Verifier 3) Challenge Generation: At this step the aggregator main- aborts if any of these signature verifications returns tains a bitmap BQ [1, . . . , |P |] initialized to 0. For every 0. If all the signatures are valid, then the protocol (Qi , pki ) received in the previous step, the aggregator sets proceeds to the next step. BQ [i] to 1. The aggregator waits for a stipulated time to If the verifier does not receive σi for every pki in P , handle network propagation delay and then computes the she also aborts. To record whether/or not she received following: P a signature from Pi , she uses a bitmap Z[1, . . . , |P |]. a) The aggregated keys: pk ← pki ∈P pki · BQ [i], i.e., Identity Setup is a one-time process followed by any she adds the public keys for whichP she received a Qi . number of the next steps. Only if the set up successfully b) She also computes Q ← i:BQ [i]=1 Qi for Qi ’s terminates, the next steps of the protocol can start. received in the previous step. 12

Pi (C, mp , m, pki , ski ) Aggregator (C, m, P ) Verifier (C, mp , P, Z) σi ← Sign(C, pki , ski , mp ) (σi , pki ) if pki ∈ / P abort $ ki ← [1, n − 1] if ¬Verify(C, σi , pki , mp ) abort Qi ← [ki ]G Z[i] = 1 Qi At the end of the setup phase: if ¬Z[i] abort P pk ← pki ∈P pki P Q ← i Qi r ← H(Q||pk||m) (r, Q, pk) r′ ← H(Q||pk||m) if r′ 6= r abort si ← (ki − r · ski ) mod n si P s ← i si mod n σ ← (r, s) (m, σ) P pk ′ ← pki ∈P pki return Verify(C, σ, pk ′ , m) Fig. 2: Multisignature using EC-Schnorr. Verifier stores a bit map Z[1, . . . , |P |], where each entry is initialized to 0. c) She then computes r ← H(Q||pk||m) mod n and an aggregated signature σ = (r, s). She then sends sends (r, Q, pk) to each Pi . (σ, m, BQ ) to the verifier. 4) Response Generation: This step is similar to the classical b) If the two bitmaps are not equal, which means a EC-Schnorr multisignature protocol. The only difference participant sent a Qi but not the corresponding si , then being that each participant Pi also sends its public key the aggregator computes the set-theoretic difference pki along with a si to the aggregator. of BQ and Bs , i.e., the set of public keys pki ∈ P 5) Response Aggregation: At this step the aggregator main- for which the aggregator received a Qi but not the tains a bitmap Bs [1, . . . , |P |] initialized to 0. For every corresponding si . The corresponding set of public keys (si , pki ) received in the previous step, the aggregator can then be blacklisted. The aggregator re-initializes checks if the received si is valid by computing Q′i ← Bs to 0 and computes the intersection between BQ and [si ]G + [r]pki and then verifying if Q′i is equal to the Bs and stores it in BQ . Finally, it repeats the protocol received Qi . If the two values are equal then she sets starting from the challenge generation step. Bs [i] to 1. This step allows to detect participants who 6) Signature Verification: The verifier first checks if the send an arbitrary value of si and attempt to mount a DoS signature was generated by at least 32 |P | + 1 participants attack. The aggregator then waits for a stipulated time to and then checks whether the multisignature is valid. The handle network propagation delay and then computes the rest of the steps are same as in the classical EC-Schnorr following: multisignature protocol. a) If the two bitmaps BQ and Bs are equal, which means the same set of participants sent messages to the aggregator in the commitment generation and response generation steps, then the P aggregator computes the aggregated response s = i si mod n and builds 13

Pi (C, mp , pki , ski ) Aggregator (C, m, BQ , Bs , P ) Verifier (C, mp , P, Z) σi ← Sign(C, pki , ski , mp ) (σi , pki ) $ ki ← [1, n − 1] Qi ← [ki ]G if pki ∈ / P abort (Qi , pki ) if ¬Verify(C, σi , pki , mp ) abort Z[i] = 1 if pki ∈ P then BQ [i] ← 1 At the end of the setup phase: if ¬Z[i] abort 1 After a certain stipulated time: P pk ← pki ∈P pki · BQ [i] P Q ← i:BQ [i]=1 Qi r ← H(Q||pk||m) mod n (r, Q, pk) r′ ← H(Q||pk||m) if r′ 6= r abort si ← (ki − r · ski ) mod n (si , pki ) Q′i ← [si ]G + [r]pki if Q′i = Qi then: Bs [i] ← 1 After a certain stipulated time: if Bs = BPQ then: s ← ( i:Bs [i]=1 si ) mod n σ ← (r, s) else: May blacklist BQ ⊖ Bs BQ ← BQ ∧ Bs Bs ← 0|P | goto 1 (σ, m, BQ ) P if i BQ [i] < 2|P |/3 + 1 then: returnP0 pk ′ ← pki ∈P pki · BQ [i] return Verify(C, σ, pk ′ , m) Fig. 3: EC-Schnorr multisignature variant used in PBFT. The leader of each committee plays the role of the aggregator. The aggregator maintains two bitmaps BQ [1, . . . , |P |] and Bs [1, . . . , |P |], while the verifier stores a bit map Z[1, . . . , |P |]. The entries of the bitmaps are initialized to 0. BQ ⊖ Bs returns a bitmap that represents the set-theoretic difference of BQ and Bs , i.e., it represents the set of public keys pki ∈ P for which the aggregator received a Qi but not the corresponding si . 14